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an emerging capital market. Performing a variant of the event study
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1 Introduction
In the late 1980s, capital markets world-wide experienced an unprece-
dented increase in the number of stocks traded by institutional investors
which increased the interest of researchers into the impact of institutional
trading on stock prices. In particular, due to the specific trading behavior of
institutions, numerous theoretical and empirical investigations put forward
arguments in favor of their impact on autocorrelation in stock returns. First,
Barclay and Warner (1993) argue that informed investors will break up their
trades and distribute them over time to lower their price impact. This will
induce an increase in autocorrelation of stock returns. As far as trades are
cross-sectionally correlated, simultaneous actions of informed institutional
traders will induce positive return autocorrelation. Chan and Lakonishok
(1995) also find empirical evidence for order-splitting by institutional traders.
A second argument for positive return autocorrelation can be derived
from the model put forward by Wang (1994). It relies on the information
asymmetry between traders and on the impact of informed trading on the
behavior of uninformed investors. The main finding is that as the share of
informed traders increases, autocorrelation in returns also increases. Cooper
(1999) finds that for stocks with high information asymmetry autocorrela-
tion in returns becomes positive. If institutional investors are assumed to
be informed (e.g. Arbel and Strebel (1983), Sias and Starks (1997), Sias,
Starks, and Titman (2001)), institutional ownership increases return auto-
correlation.
Third, it can be argued that sequential information arrival induces in-
creases in return autocorrelation. As the best informed traders receive price-
relevant information and trade on it, prices move in one direction. As the
second-best informed traders later receive the same information, they also
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trade on it, moving the prices even further.1 This sequential trading causes
the price to move in one direction for a certain period of time, inducing posi-
tive autocorrelation. Findings of Sias and Starks (1997) that autocorrelation
in stock returns depends positively on the fraction of (best informed) insti-
tutional traders, and that this autocorrelation is positive, provide us with
empirical evidence in favor of this postulate. Holden and Subrahmanyam
(2002) also show that returns are positively autocorrelated under the condi-
tion of sequential information acquisition.
Fourth, positive feedback trading and herding by institutional investors
may increase return autocorrelation. Results reported by Sias and Starks
(1997) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) are in line with this hypothesis. From
their analysis of mutual funds, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) con-
clude that there is evidence of momentum trading by these investors. Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), however, find only weak evidence that
pension funds engage in positive feedback trading and herding. Furthermore,
their findings support the positive feedback trading and herding hypothesis
only for small stocks. McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) note that mo-
mentum trading and herding are more pronounced in the case of up markets
than down markets. Badrinath and Wahal (2002) analyze the behavior of
various institutions at different stages of the investment process and find
only modest evidence for momentum trading. This is due to the fact that
institutions act as momentum traders when they initiate a new position in
a stock, but follow a contrarian approach when they re-balance portfolios
or terminate their position in a stock. Evidence of momentum trading for
pension funds is especially weak.
1The first trader might be unwilling to fully exploit his information due to the price
impact considerations of his action and the information revelation of his trades. Moreover,
the degree of uncertainty about the quality of the private signal might be an explanation:
as more and more traders obtain private information, it becomes less uncertain and agents
are more willing to trade on it (Holden and Subrahmanyam (2002)).
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In contrast to the large body of empirical evidence finding an increase
in autocorrelation in stock returns due to institutional trading, the argu-
ment that increasing institutional ownership lowers autocorrelation in stock
returns finds only weak support in the literature. Badrinath, Kale, and Noe
(1995) argue that, due to the differential information set-up costs and legal
restrictions, institutional investors will acquire information on (and purchase)
only a subset of traded firms. This will cause a shift in stock prices. The
remaining stocks traded by less informed investors will adjust to the market-
wide information contained in these trades with a lag. One prediction of
their model is that stocks with a higher (lower) level of institutional owner-
ship will experience quicker (slower) adjustment to information and, hence,
lower (higher) autocorrelation in returns. Empirical results presented by the
authors are in line with these predictions.
This brief review of the literature shows that the available empirical
findings mainly provide evidence in favor of positive stock return autocor-
relation and that the investigations concentrate, without exception, on the
US stock market. In contrast, by exploiting a unique institutional charac-
teristic of the Polish stock market, our empirical findings do not support the
hypothesis of positive return autocorrelation due to institutional investors’
trading. The special feature arises from the pension reform in Poland in
1999 when privately managed pension funds were established and started
to invest on the domestic capital market. We focus on the return behavior
of stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) prior to and after
the first transfer of money to the pension funds on May 19, 1999. The ap-
pearance of large institutional traders and the resulting increase in institu-
tional ownership makes it possible for us to investigate the impact on return
autocorrelation. Specifically, relying on both a standard and a non-linear
autoregression-cum-GARCH framework, we test whether autocorrelation co-
efficients in the return time series of stocks actively traded by pension funds
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increase after the increase in institutional holdings, as often found in the
finance literature. Moreover, we investigate the relationship between the
change in return autocorrelation and the increase in institutional trading af-
ter the appearance of pension funds in the cross-section of our sample.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
the pension reform in Poland, its consequences for the capital market, and
the data are described. We present the time series methodology, the cross-
sectional approach, and empirical results in Section 3, while Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Institutional Traders on the Polish Stock
Market and Data
Trading on the Polish stock market exclusively takes place on the
WSE. Re-established in 1991, the WSE was designed as an order-driven call
market. Continuous trading was launched in 1996 and the most liquid stocks
were gradually introduced into this system. The WSE is the most liquid
stock market in Central Eastern Europe. The total turnover in stocks in
2001 was more than ten billion euro and was thus roughly twice as high as
the turnover on the Budapest Stock Exchange, the second most important
stock market of the region. The free float is estimated in newspaper reports
to be roughly 30%.2 Due to its success, the WSE has attracted considerable
interest from foreign investors. Nevertheless, the majority of traders have
been small, private investors.3
A major change in the investor structure took place after the Polish
pension reform. In 1999, the public pension system was enriched by a pri-
2Data on the free float of individual stocks are not available on the WSE, therefore we
are not able to include this measure in the analysis.
3For a detailed description of the trading systems and the investor structure see WSE
(2002).
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vate component. Younger citizens were forced to invest part of their in-
come in privately managed open-end pension funds, the so-called ”Otwarte
Fundusze Emerytalne” (OFEs).4 A significant share of the workforce chose
the new system and a large amount of money was transferred to the OFEs
by the Polish Social Security Institution, the so-called ”Zak lad Ubezpieczen´
Spo lecznych” (ZUS). The ZUS is responsible for collecting the savings of all
employees and transfering them to the OFEs. The first transfer of money
to the OFEs took place on May 19, 1999. By the end of 1999, Polish OFEs
had 2.3 billion Polish zlotys at their disposal, and by the end of 2001, their
holdings amounted to 18.5 billion Polish zlotys.
OFEs are obliged to publish their total holdings annually and all posi-
tions that exceed 1% of their entire portfolio semi-annually. We combined the
data from the publications of all pension funds to construct a hand-collected
data set of pension fund holdings in Poland. These publications show that
the number of OFEs active on the market varies over time due to the liq-
uidation of old and the emergence of new funds, but it is relatively stable
between 15 and 20. The four largest OFEs account for 70% of all pension
fund holdings.5
Common stocks are an important component of OFEs portfolios. The
share of stocks constantly amounted to more than 20% of total funds invested
and gradually increased over time. Thus, OFEs became important players
on the Polish stock market. The appearance of OFEs makes it possible for
us to compare the period before May 19, 1999, that is mainly characterized
by non-institutional trading with the period after that date, where OFEs
account for a considerable share of market volume.
From the OFE publications, we are able to identify those stocks that
4Older citizens had the choice of investing in OFEs or exclusively relying on the public
pension system.
5Data on the portfolio structures of all Polish OFE are available on request from the
authors.
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they traded actively. We select the thirty stocks most actively traded by
OFEs on the Polish stock market. By focusing on the stocks that were sub-
ject to institutional trading, we can test the influence of institutional traders
on stock return autocorrelation. As a measure of OFE trading activity in
stock i, we choose the monetary value of the OFE holdings of stock i at the
end of 2000 divided by total turnover of stock i during the same period
INSTi =
monetary value of the OFE holdings of stock i
total turnover of stock i
. (1)
This variable measures the cumulative net purchases of all pension funds
in our sample as a percentage of the stock’s overall trading volume.6 Data
on trading volume and stock prices were provided by the WSE. We prefer
a relative measure over the absolute value of OFE holdings as the theory
outlined in section 1 predicts that the impact of institutional trading is higher
the larger the share of these players in the market. As a robustness check,
however, we selected the thirty stocks with the largest absolute values of
OFE holdings. Several of these stocks were identical to the stocks selected
using a relative measure and the overall results did not vary significantly
from those reported in the paper. Additional information on the stocks used
in our study are presented in Table 1.
[Table 1 around here]
The table shows that OFE holdings of the thirty stocks comprise more
than 6% of the overall trading volume for each stock. For the five stocks
with the highest percentage share of institutional trading, the ratio of OFEs
holdings to total volume is larger than one third. Thus, trading of pension
6Since we only have data on the OFE holdings and not on OFE trading volume, the
true share of OFE trading volume may even be higher. This would be the case if some
funds bought additional shares during the investigation period and sold them before the
reporting day. Since OFEs are long-term investors and had to invest large amounts of
money in a relatively short period of time, it is likely that the number of sells is rather
low and that our indicator consistently mirrors OFE trading behavior.
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funds accounts for a large percentage share of overall trading volume.
To check the robustness of the results and to investigate whether possi-
ble changes in autocorrelation are related to the appearance of pension fund
investors or are a market-wide phenomenon, we additionally use a sample of
control stocks in our empirical investigation. This control sample consists of
30 stocks, which were randomly selected from the remaining stocks listed on
the WSE. We are not able to construct a control sample of stocks matched
to the stocks in Table 1 with respect to market capitalization and trading
volume because all large and frequently traded stocks are in the OFE port-
folios. Thus, there are no stocks with comparable size and volume remaining
on the market.
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that our sample is well-
suited for the investigation of institutional trading on stock return autocorre-
lation. We will now turn to the econometric techniques used and the results
of our empirical analysis.
3 Methodology and Empirical Results
First, we conduct an empirical investigation of institutional traders’
influence on return autocorrelation by estimating the following model for
daily returns
Rit = αi0 + αi1Rit−1 + αi2DtRit−1 + εit (2)
and
hit = βi0 + βi1ε
2
it−1 + βi2hit−1. (3)
The return on stock i is defined as the logarithmic difference in prices,
Rit = ln Pit − ln Pit−1, where Pit denotes the stock price. εit ∼ N(0, hit)
is the unpredictable component of the returns. The dummy variable, Dt,
in equation (2) is zero before May 19, 1999, and one afterwards. Note that
before May 19, 1999, the expected return is E(Rit) = αi0 + αi1E(Rit−1),
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while in the period after the entrance of institutional traders in the Polish
stock market it is E(Rit) = αi0 + (αi1 + αi2)E(Rit−1). Consistent with our
discussion on the influence of institutional traders on stock returns, the αi2
parameter is expected to be positive and statistically significant resulting in
a positive sum (αi1 +αi2). With the GARCH(1,1) model (3) we take into ac-
count the well-known conditional heteroscedasticity characteristics of many
financial time series.7
Table 2 reports the test results of the impact of institutional traders
on the autocorrelation structure of the Polish stocks discussed in section 2.
Equations (2) and (3) are jointly estimated for three different periods, namely
January 2, 1999 - December 30, 1999; July 1, 1998 - June 30, 2000; and Jan-
uary 2, 1998 - December 30, 2000, to provide a check of robustness. As can
be seen from Table 2, in the minority of all cases we observe statistically sig-
nificant αi1 and αi2 coefficients. Although the αi2 parameters are positive for
a substantial number of stocks only six of them are positive and statistically
significant at the conventional levels. With respect to the sum of coefficients,
in the majority of cases (αi1+αi2) is negative. The values of the remaining
positive sums are relatively low and result from statistically insignificant αi1
and αi2 parameters. Only for three stocks (Stalprodukt, BSK, and PBK),
the empirical results are in line with the theoretical prediction that institu-
tional trading generates positive autocorrelation in individual stock returns.
However, for these three stocks the empirical evidence is not robust with
respect to the selection of the sample. In all other cases the findings are not
consistent with this hypothesis.
[Table 2 around here]
7In addition to the standard GARCH(1,1) model we estimated a modified GARCH
specification in line with Glosten, Jaganathan, and Runkle (1993) to take into account
asymmetry in individual stock returns’ volatility. In only six out of 90 regressions we
found evidence in favor of asymmetries (results are not reported but are available on
request). Hence, we rely on the standard GARCH(1,1) model.
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To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the model given
by equations (2) and (3) for a control sample of 30 stocks as described in
Section 2 for the three periods under investigation. The results (not reported
but available on request) are similar to those reported in Table 2, i.e., the
parameter αˆi2 is insignificant in the majority of cases and does not provide
evidence in favor of positive return autocorrelation.
Second, we analyze whether the lack of significant changes in the au-
tocorrelation structure is due to a misspecification of the model for daily re-
turns. Substantial empirical evidence (LeBaron (1992), Booth and Koutmos
(1998a), (1998b), Watanabe (2002)) shows that the autocorrelation pattern
of stock returns exhibits complexity that cannot be captured completely by
the simple first-order autocorrelation coefficient in equation (2). In partic-
ular, an inverse relationship between first-order return autocorrelation and
volatility has been found for some markets. To account for this effect, we
model stock returns as conditionally heteroscedastic processes with time-
dependent autocorrelation, in line with LeBaron (1992), in the following way
Rit = γi01 + γi02Dt + f(hit)Rit−1 + f ′(hit)Rit−1Dt + εit, (4)
where
f(hit) = γi11 + γi21 exp(−hit/σ2i ), (5)
and
f ′(hit) = γi12 + γi22 exp(−hit/σ2i ). (6)
In addition, the simple GARCH(1,1) process may be misspecified because the
volatility process contains a structural break after May 19, 1999. A general
model specification for the conditional volatility is given by
hit = βi01 + βi02Dt + βi11ε
2
it−1 + βi12ε
2
it−1Dt + βi21hit−1 + βi22hit−1Dt. (7)
The notation is known from the discussion above. σ2i is the sample variance
of the return time series of stock i. Before May 19, 1999, the expected re-
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turn equals E(Rit) = γi01 + γi11E(Rit−1) during high volatility periods, and
E(Rit) = γi01 + (γi11 + γi21)E(Rit−1) during low volatility periods. In the pe-
riod after the entrance of institutional traders into the Polish stock market
the expected return is equal to E(Rit) = (γi01 + γi02) + (γi11 + γi12)E(Rit−1)
when the conditional volatility is high and E(Rit) = (γi01+γi02)+(γi11+γi21+
γi12 +γi22)E(Rit−1) when the conditional volatility is low. Hence, the change
in the autocorrelation coefficient resulting from the entrance of pension fund
investors is given by γi12 for the high volatility regime, and by (γi12 + γi22)
for the low volatility regime. Consistent with our discussion of the influence
of institutional traders on stock returns, the parameters γi12 and (γi12 +γi22)
are expected to be positive and statistically significant resulting in positive
sums (γi11 + γi12) and (γi11 + γi21 + γi12 + γi22).
Results of the estimation of equations (4) to (7) for our three estimation
periods (not reported but available upon request) clearly show that for both
low and high volatility regimes only a few of the parameters of interest are
statistically significant. Focusing on the significant ones, no definite conclu-
sion can be made about the prevailing sign of stock return autocorrelation.
This statement is valid for both the period before and after the entrance of
pension fund investors on the Polish stock market. In sum, we have found
little empirical evidence for Polish stocks that would support the hypothesis
that institutional trading induces positive return autocorrelation. Only in a
few cases are the estimated coefficients statistically significant and consistent
with the hypothesized positive return autocorrelation, while in the majority
of cases the parameters are insignificant or their values contradict the hy-
pothesis under study.
The pension funds probably entered the Polish stock market only grad-
ually. Hence, shortly after the first transfer from the ZUS on May 19, 1999,
it may be unlikely to find evidence in favor of the pension funds’ influence
on stock returns. Therefore, we omitted a period of three as well as of six
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months after May 19,1999, to provide evidence on a potential bias in the
results presented above against finding an impact of pension funds’ trading
on stock returns. Our empirical findings (not reported but available on re-
quest) support our main conclusion. Omitting three and six months after
May 19, 1999, respectively, does not change the finding that in the over-
whelming majority of cases the appearance of pension fund investors do not
induce positive return autocorrelation.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between stock return autocor-
relation and institutional trading in the cross-section of our sample. In order
to have a sufficient number of observations, we include all stocks in the cross-
sectional regressions that were traded by Polish pension funds. We obtain 53
stocks which we include in the analysis. We aim to investigate whether there
is a systematic relationship between the increase in institutional trading and
the change in return autocorrelation after the appearance of pension fund
investors on the market.
To answer this question, we first estimate equation (2) for all 53 stocks
and obtain estimates of αˆ2i. This parameter measures the increase in return
autocorrelation of stock i after the appearance of pension funds. We then
regress the estimated coefficient αˆ2 on the change in institutional trading. In-
stitutional trading in stock i is captured by our relative measure of pension
fund activity defined in equation (1), INSTi,
αˆ2i = β0 + β1INSTi + εi. (8)
If there is a positive relationship between the amount of institutional trading
in stock i, INSTi, and the change in autocorrelation, αˆ2i, as suggested by
the theory, we will observe positive and significant values of β1.
8
8As αˆ2i is obtained as a ML estimate, it may be measured with error. Since this
parameter is the dependent variable in regression (8), however, it does not lead to biased
parameter estimates. Any potential measurement error is captured by the error term εi.
See Judge et al. (1988) for more details.
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The appearance of institutional investors on the market also increases
the trading volume of stocks. Since it is well known that higher volume
decreases autocorrelation (see Boudoukh et al. (1994)), we disentangle the
impact of institutional trading from trading volume on return autocorrelation
and run a second regression with the relative institutional trading measure
and the change in trading volume as the explanatory variables. The change
in trading volume of stock i, ∆V OLi, is defined as the logarithm of the ratio
between average trading volume of the stock in the post-event and pre-event
period, where pre- and post-event periods are separated by the event day
May 19, 1999. The extended regression model has the form
αˆ2i = β0 + β1INSTi + β2∆V OLi + εi. (9)
In Table 2, we have reported coefficient estimates of αˆ2i for three different sub-
periods. We therefore calculate regressions (8) and (9) for all three estimates
of αˆ2i separately and obtain six individual regression equations. The results
are presented in Table 3.
[Table 3 around here]
The table reports estimates of αˆ2i over three different time periods.
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent using the White (1980) cor-
rection. Moreover, we checked the regression for possible multicollinearity
between the relative institutional trading measure and the change in trading
volume. Since the absolute value of the correlation coefficients between the
institutional trading measure and the change in volume varied between 0.15
and 0.29 in the three estimation periods, multicollinearity does not seem to
be present in the data.
The results reported in Table 3 indicate a negative relationship be-
tween changes in autocorrelation and the amount of institutional trading in
our sample. All estimated β1 coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Vol-
ume has a positive impact on autocorrelation, but the estimates of β2 are
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only significant at the 10% level for the period January 2, 1998 to December
31, 2000 and insignificant for the periods July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2000 and
the shortest period covering the year 1999. The explanatory power of the
regressions measured by R2 coefficients is higher for the periods covering the
year 2000 with values between 0.187 and 0.280. Overall, the findings indicate
a robust negative relationship between the amount of institutional trading
and the change in autocorrelation across our sample.
This finding contradicts the majority of empirical studies on the im-
pact of institutional trading on return autocorrelation as outlined in section 1.
The negative relationship between autocorrelation and institutional trading
can result from increased information flow due to the trades of pension funds
as outlined in Badrinath et al. (1995). If pension fund managers are better
informed than other investors about the fundamental values of the stocks
they trade, their trading may cause a faster adjustment of stock prices to
fundamentals and, correspondingly, a decrease in return autocorrelation.
A variable likely to affect autocorrelation is bid-ask bounce. Since
stocks are traded at their bid and ask prices, quoted prices fluctuate around
the quote midpoint, which introduces negative autocorrelation into the re-
turn series. The larger the spread, the larger the degree of autocorrelation
(see, e.g., Roll (1984)). Thus, if bid-ask spreads change over time so may
autocorrelation.
Unfortunately, spread data are not available on the WSE for the time
under investigation. However, a market-wide change in bid-ask spreads does
not affect our main results obtained from estimation of equations (8) and (9).
If autocorrelation coefficients of all stocks are affected by changes in bid-ask
spreads identically, this effect will be observable in the intercept term β0 in
both regressions but will not have any effect on the regression coefficient β1.
Changes in bid-ask spreads only have an impact if they are correlated
with the measure of institutional trading. This can happen in two ways:
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First, stocks with a higher degree of institutional trading become more liq-
uid, which causes spreads to narrow and autocorrelation to increase. This
contradicts our finding in Table 3 which implies a stable negative relationship
between the measure of institutional trading and changes in autocorrelation.
Moreover, liquidity changes are captured by the control variable ∆V OLi in
equation (9). The coefficient β1, however, remains significantly negative even
after controlling for changes in liquidity.
Second, bid-ask spreads are correlated with the measure of institutional
trading if the institutional investors are better informed investors and, thus,
small investors lose money when they trade with them. In this case, a higher
degree of institutional trading causes adverse selection components of spreads
to increase since the probability of informed trading is higher, and autocor-
relation decreases with the degree of institutional trading. This negative
relationship between the degree of institutional trading and changes in au-
tocorrelation is reported in Table 3. Again, this finding lends support to our
view that the appearance of institutional investors on the Polish stock mar-
ket ensures a better flow of information, which leads to a decrease in stock
return autocorrelation.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we provide additional empirical evidence on the impact
of institutional investors on stock return autocorrelation. The reform of the
Polish pension system in 1999 is used as an institutional peculiarity to per-
form a variant of the event study methodology for individual stock returns
traded by pension fund investors. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge,
all studies investigating the impact of institutional investors on stock prices
rely on US data and no study is publicly available for an emerging capital
market. The implementation of a standard and a non-linear autoregression-
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cum-GARCH framework allows us to answer the question of whether the
increase in institutional ownership after the first appearance of Polish pen-
sion funds on May 19, 1999, resulted in increasing and positive return auto-
correlation as suggested in a substance number of theoretical and empirical
studies. Cross-sectional regressions on the relationship between the change
in return autocorrelation and the increase in institutional trading provide
further insight into the importance of pension fund trading for return auto-
correlation.
Our empirical findings for the 30 stocks most actively traded by Polish
pension funds show that in the vast majority of cases the increase in in-
stitutional ownership does not have an impact on the return autocorrelation
structure of the individual stocks. This empirical finding is fairly robust with
respect to different model specifications and sample periods. Furthermore,
our findings from the cross-sectional analysis show that the level of pension
funds’ trading in a stock is negatively related to its return autocorrelation.
These results are in contrast to theoretical arguments in favor of positive
return autocorrelation due to institutional ownership. However, the findings
are consistent with the empirical results in Lakonishok et al. (1992) as well
as Badrinath and Wahal (2002) who also find only weak evidence in favor
of positive feedback trading or momentum trading and herding by pension
fund investors. Our findings are in line with the hypothesis that institutional
traders encourage information flows and accelerate the adjustment of stock
prices to their fundamental levels, thereby increasing efficiency of the stock
market (Lakonishok et al. (1992), Badrinath et al. (1995)).
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Table 1: Institutional characteristics of stocks actively traded by pension
funds
Company Sector OFE holdings / OFE holdings
total turnover (million zlotys)
Inter Groclin Other Industry 0.485 6.73
Petrobank Bank 0.466 12.19
Echo Construction 0.431 48.32
Permedia Chemicals 0.382 4.01
Instal Construction 0.346 4.02
NFI 03 Investment fund 0.210 49.65
Ropczyce Chemicals 0.201 3.38
Strzelec Food 0.189 5.26
Lentex Building materials 0.173 21.35
NFI 04 Investment fund 0.165 10.42
Kety Metals 0.162 46.01
Bauma Building materials 0.150 1.92
Stomil Olsztyn Chemicals 0.118 69.35
Swiecie Wood and paper 0.116 55.76
Viscoplast Light Industry 0.104 2.32
Grajewo Wood and paper 0.102 7.60
Stalprodukt Metals 0.094 5.46
WBK Bank 0.094 69.44
Pekao S.A. Bank 0.092 239.29
NFI10 Investment fund 0.088 6.70
BPH Bank 0.086 50.54
Poligrafia Other services 0.084 1.92
PGF Wholesale & Retails 0.077 13.45
Kable Electronics 0.072 1.87
Budimex Construction 0.071 30.10
Impexmetal Metals 0.071 8.17
PBK Bank 0.069 120.25
BSK Bank 0.068 64.14
Pia Piasecki Construction 0.066 3.17
Yawal Building materials 0.062 2.94
Note: The table presents the thirty stocks most actively traded by Polish
pension funds and their corresponding sectors. Column three displays our
measure of institutional trading activity. It is defined as the absolute holdings
of pension funds at the end of the year 2000 divided by absolute trading
volume over the period May 19, 1999 to the end of the year 2000.
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Table 3: Cross-sectional regression results on the relationship between insti-
tutional trading and the change in return autocorrelation
Dependent variable: αˆ2i
Period Intercept INSTi ∆V OLi Adj. R
2
99-01-02 to 99-12-31 0.107*** -0.410*** 0.086
0.107*** -0.383*** 0.017 0.072
98-07-01 to 00-06-30 0.081*** -0.667*** 0.261
0.067*** -0.624*** 0.038 0.280
98-01-02 to 00-12-31 0.066*** -0.538*** 0.187
0.063*** -0.498*** 0.037* 0.215
Note: The table presents regression results of the change in autocorrelation
of stock i, αˆ2i, on the relative institutional trading measure, INSTi, and the
change in trading volume of stock i, ∆V OLi, as described in equations (8)
and (9). Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent using the White
(1980) correction. *** and * denote significance at the 1% and 10% level,
respectively.
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